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Abstract 
Islamic da’wah in Malaysia has given and is still giving a gigantic impact on the country in many aspects of life, especially 
politics. Through library research and observation, this study tries to address the relationship between Islamic da’wah and politics 
in general terms before examining it in some details in regard with Malaysia itself. It further attempts to discover the reasons 
behind the Islamic da’wah resurgence and its impact on Malaysia’s politics. The study suggests that by Islamic da’wah 
resurgence, Islam has become pivotal to the politics in Malaysia basically when the government co-opted Islamism which 
resulted it to become the instrument of Islamisation and the advancement of the religion has since been used as the modus 
Vivendi for many da’wah groups and individuals. 
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The term ‘da’wah resurgence’ does not mean any different to the term of ‘Islamic resurgence’ which is used widely 
when considering al-sahwah or the resurgence of political Islam, except that it refers to al-da’wah as being the 
reason, in many cases, behind the resurgence itself, especially what this paper in going to discuss.  Al-da’wah is an 
important concept in Islam that implies an obligation of all Muslims to undertake the duty of conveying the 
messages of Islam into all mankind. The duty is summoned by Islam for the Muslims to call people to worship Allah 
as the God, the ‘only’ God (Surat al-Nahl: 36) and establish Islam as the way of life (Ali Imran: 85). According to 
Abdullah Muhammad Zin 1990), al-da’wah entails some other terms in Islam such as encouraging people to 
establish Islam such as jihad in the way of Allah, enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, warning the bad 
news and announce the good news which are stated clearly in the Quran and Hadith, two most important books of 
Islam. Malaysia in particular, experienced the transformation of da’wah into Islamic resurgence which is sometimes 
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referred as political Islam. 
Islamic da’wah resurgence is suggested as being an attempt to retrieve or to revamp a type of Islamicly ruled state 
which at some point had been demolished since the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate. The Islamists believe that 
Islam possesses a specific theory on politics and the states. Perhaps, the dogma that Islam is both ‘a religion and a 
state’ or ‘din wa dawlah’ as suggested by Al-Mawdudi (1997) is a widely held opinion amongst Muslims. In fact, 
the major raison d’etre for a ‘rebellion’ in Muslim world is due to the embracement of secular value by states rulers 
who are seemed to ignore the Shariah. 
 
DA’WAH AND MUSLIM POLITICS 
While politics can be defined as the process by which groups of people make decision and also the science of 
government, a number of Muslim scholars, traditionally and contemporarily, have written on the theory of as-
siyasah ash-shar’iyyah or what the writer would translate as Islamic politics. Khallaf (1998) defines it as ‘to 
administrate the general of an Islamic state in terms what can bring goodness and prevent badness in accordance to 
Islam’. In addition, the prominent Muslim scholar and ideologue, Yousuf Al-Qaradhawi (2007) argues that even the 
word siyasah (politics) is not mentioned in the Qur’an, the Muslim holy book, many verses indicate towards it by 
using words such as al-mulk (the reign) and al-hukm (the rule). 
It was apparent that a wave of political frustration was growing between the ruling Muslim elites and Islamist 
activists who doubt the powers of the former. The latter demand a state and society wherein social values and 
principles adhere solely to the tenets of Islam, including bureaucracy. Muslims in general began to question their 
religious identity vis-à-vis the secular nation-state system, especially within the contemporary, globalised 
community. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emerge of what so called ‘authoritarianism crisis’ in the 
Muslim world which stretch from Indonesia to Morocco, Islamist activists have actively engaged in da’wah and 
political arena by adapting democracy as a viable alternative to have their voiced heard as well as to gain power. 
Muslim politics, as Dale Eickleman and James Piscatori (1996: 5) termed it can be defined as “the competition and 
contest over both the interpretation of symbols and control of the institutions”. 
The battle, by no other means, is entirely a fight between Muslim rulers and Islamists who generally want to live 
more Islamic than what they get in their countries. Neither patriotism nor nationalism encouraged to this 
antagonism, rather the utopian portion of ‘Islamic state’ is the raison d’etre behind this vendetta. Therefore, 
‘political Islam’ as explained by Nazih Ayubi (1991), is a kind of protest movement against ‘un-Islamic’ states. 
Political Islam sometimes referred to as ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, as pointed out by Esposito (1997: 1), is a global 
and diverse phenomenon. While some Islamic resistances are clearly engaging in arm movements and reject the 
existing politics to achieve power, there are many others that take peaceful steps by embracing a democratic system 
and participating in elections to win parliament and to serve in cabinet positions. 
Though it was suggested that most Muslim countries, following their independences, turned to their western allies 
for development model, ‘Islam’ has proven to be a major force in the public life of many Muslim societies since late 
1960s or early 70s in social, economics and politics. Islam has therefore been the source of political development 
and symbol of political legitimacy in global scope. In addition, Muslim governments too have appealed to Islam to 
keep them in authority and to gain popular support. The Muslim ummah embraced both ‘church’ and state, and 
looking to the early and past Islamic community as an example. (Derek Hopwood: 1971) 
Islamic da’wah movements represent modern Islamic resurgence by driving dynamics and effective social services 
by running charity organisations around the globe. From Indonesia to Morocco, Islamic da’wah groups in Muslim 
countries have increasingly clashed with their own governments. They gain support through the label and under the 
banner of ‘Islam’ and also by rising global political issues concerning Islam, and issues concerning corruption and 
social illness within their countries (Nasr: 2001 and Esposito: 1997). Politics in the Muslim world in recent years 
has indicated a growing rebellion of Muslim societies towards the West as well as towards their own rulers. Muslim 
countries in the post-independence period were abandoning Islam en masse and this was considered by Muslim 
revivalists or Islamists as the impact and legacy of western colonial rules. (Babaer: 1993) 
 
ISLAM, DA’WAH AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA 
In Malaysia, the status of Malay is synonymous to Islam. For the Malays the concept of being Malay is not solely to 
do with ethnicity. Today, the term is fairly understood by the populace. However, the picture is not clear as the 
Federal Constitution defines ‘Malay’ as one who professes the religion of Islam, speaks the Malay language 
habitually and conforms to its customs. Technically means that anyone can be Malay if the conditions above are 
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met. And out of these conditions, Islam is the most important. Manning Nash (1991: 699) explains in ‘The 
Fundamentalism Project’ that ‘the equation of Malay identity with the Islamic identity is one of the few axioms in 
the cultural logic of Malaysia ethnic pluralism’. Therefore, people of any race, Arab, Persian, Chinese, Indian or 
even European can all be Malays if they are Muslims speak the Malay language and adhere to Malay customs and 
cultures.   
Malaysia gained its independence from the British colonial rule on August 31, 1957 under the name of Malaya or 
‘Tanah Melayu’ which means ‘Land of Malays’. Six years later, in 1963, the Federation of Malaysia was created, 
comprising states of Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore regardless the famous ‘Konfrontasi’ 
(confrontation) by Indonesia and Philippines towards its formation. 
Since ‘Merdeka’ or independence in 1957, the rulling Alliance/National Front (BN) has been in power. The BN is 
not a single multi-racial party but a partnership of UMNO, MCA and MIC. However, it is largely controlled by 
UMNO and the reality of Malay political domination within the Alliance has seldom been questioned. Tungku 
Abdul Rahman had ruled the country on the basis of the division that the political power should be under the control 
of the Malay whilst the Chinese should be satisfied with their commercial monopoly (Slimming: 1969: 8). 
According to Mauzy (1995) UMNO’s commitment to Islam was limited and specified into certain subjects. Its early 
leaders did not believe in the practicality of establishing an Islamic State in Malaysia and had shown no desire 
towards it by them. The interest was put in the creation of a modern, developed secular state.  
DA’WAH TURNS POLITICAL 
While the first leaders of UMNO were uniformly westernised aristocrats and the model adopted by the organisation 
was, largely if not fully, western-style, its major aim was to unite all Malays. To actualise such an aim, an umbrella 
was created which all various backgrounds of Malays could fit in. Only a year before Dato’ Onn’s resignation, a 
religious wing was created under UMNO known as Persatuan Ulamak se-Malaysia (Pan-Malayan Union of the 
Religiously Learned) to satisfy the demands of Muslims/Malays. However, due to UMNO demand for the 
liberalisation of citizenship requirements and other national issues, the organisation broke away in 1951 to be the 
beginning of political revivalism when the Islamic wing decided to establish an independent political party (Ibrahim 
Ahmad: 1989).  
Caused by this breaking up, Pan-Malaya Islamic Party (PMIP) was contemplated. The Islamic Party later on 
changed its English name to Malay name Parti Islam se-Malaysia and is better known by its Jawi-Malay acronym of 
PAS. This party, after some years in the political wilderness, succeeded in uniting many of the anti-UMNO groups 
across the country and led the way to challenge UMNO for leadership of the Malays.  
Originated not only from UMNO, it was also joined by two other distinct groups to make linked with both Islamic 
concern and Malay nationalism. After the split, a gathering was held to form an Islamic party and it was heavily 
attended by former members of Hizbul Muslimin, a reformist Islamic organisation that has dissolved itself to avoid 
from being proscribed by the British ruler in 1948. In early days of its formation, PAS worked as an Islamic welfare 
organisation and did not register as political party until shortly before the 1955 election. It won the only opposition 
seat in that year. PAS members today prefer to relate the party with Hizbul Muslimin rather than with UMNO. PAS 
was joined by a third group when Dr. Burhanuddin Al-Helmy [1911-1969], the de facto leader of the Malayan 
National Party (MNP) joined it and followed by a massive number of his supporters. In fact, MNP had been a 
radical and secular party committed solely to socialism (Mauzy: 1995). 
An extensive study about the origin of PAS by Nasharudin Mat Isa (2001) found that the Islamic party did not 
originate from UMNO, but from the Persatuan Ulamak Gunong Semanggol (Gunong Semanggol Ulama Union) 
who had participated with UMNO to create Pan-Malaya Ulama Union and they decided that the creation would be 
inside UMNO on the basis of unity. On 24 November 1951, the Ulama Union conducted a gathering to create a 
party that will take Islam as its identity and finally created Persatuan Islam se-Malaya (Pan Malayan Islamic Union) 
and there were a number of religious scholars including from UMNO who had studied at Maahad al-Ihya’ asy-
Syarif Gunong Semanggol which resulted a clash with UMNO. The study found that there is a technical confusion 
that led to thought of PAS being originated from UMNO. 
Ideologically, with these three distinct origins, Parti Islam se-Malaysia –traditionally- represents a complex 
contradictive combination of radical socialist and conservative feudal Malay nationalism. In the context of Islam, it 
represents both reformist and traditionalist Islamist.  
For UMNO, the struggle was to preserve the Malay race, language and customs. While for its main rival, the former 
MNP, it was primarily to emphasise the religion of Islam, then race and language. In fact, it has been twice, directly 
or indirectly reconstituted and renamed; in 1951, it joined Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. Then in 1973, to a great 
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embarrassment to UMNO to the date - to be having its name in English language – it changed its English name to 
Malay Party Islam se-Malaysia or PAS. 
UMNO, before the Islamic wing left the party, has already sponsored a number of Islamic settings such as Islamic 
studies scholarships and the implementation of Islamic family laws. After the split, efforts and money were spent to 
retain the support of Islamic leaders and scholars - ulamaks and ustazs. New mosques and suraus (prayer 
rooms/houses) were built, national and international tilawah for Quran recitation competition become an annual 
programme, Islamic education system was introduced, et cetera.   
The first Prime Minister, Tungku Abdul Rahman, in many respects, had more in common with leaders or leading 
members of MCA and MIC than with the members of his own party. In style and appearance, he was more British 
than Malay. In religious affiliation, he was not so interested and so much attracted to such un-Islamic customs and 
forms of gambling (Funston: 1980: 16). 
Soon after 1969 riots Tun Abdul Razak [1922-1976] who succeeded Tungku focused on remodelling the party 
system that would enlarge the Alliance and reduced opposition on the banner of Malay unity. The Barisan National 
(National Front) was mentioned in the public in 1927 but only officially formed in June 1974. Originally presented 
as a ‘concept’ it then become a realised coalition. The most important party to join the coalition was the Islamic 
party (PAS) which held power in Kelantan. The joining of PAS was perhaps a triumph to Razak because PAS has 
always been UMNO’s main rival for the Malay vote and perhaps because of its strength and ability to expand. PAS 
was attracted to join UMNO by the prospect of affirming Malay unity after the riots and also to cooperate to success 
the National Economics Policy. There could be many other reasons why PAS joined the coalition. A powerful 
reason could have been that a party in the BN could actually qualify to receive patronage from the federal 
government and also to realise its Islamic agenda through governmental departments. However, PAS did not stay 
long in the coalition when it was expelled from it in 1977. 
Since Malay identity is not separated from Islam, PAS seems like willing to help UMNO when the Malay 
supremacy is threatened. This attitude of PAS is pretty obvious when it reacted to join the BN in 1974. Indeed, this 
reminds that the party had a strong origin of Malay nationalism as one of the organisations to found it was Partai 
Kebangsaan Melayu (Malay Nationalist Party). However, since the nationalist leadership of the Islamic party was 
toppled by ulamak in early 80s, many in PAS would reject Malay supremacy to be above Islamic supremacy. 
To some extent, the development of Islam in Malaysia could be much associated to Dr Mahathir Mohamad with his 
return to the forefront of the Malaysian politics in the 70s. Earlier his political life he was seen as an ultra Malay 
who was seen by Prime Minister Tungku Abdul Rahman as a threat to the fragile relationship between the Malays 
and the Chinese in the country. He was once put under the party’s disciplinary hearing and banished from UMNO. 
In 1974 he returned active in politics as Education Minister, and two years later he was elevated to the post of 
Deputy Prime Minister and he became the Prime Minister in 1981. In the same year, his government announced a 
seminar entitled ‘The Concept of Development in Islam’, the recommendations of which were adopted by the 
government. Perhaps, Mahathir had done more in favour of Islam than his predecessors by exerting the image of 
Islam in his administration. In addition, Mahathir made many major policies in the beginning of his career as the 
new Prime Minister of Malaysia, and his policies include; the establishment of Islamic economic institutions such as 
the ‘Bank Islam”; the co-optation of the youth Islamic leader Anwar Ibrahim into UMNO and the Cabinet; the 
upgrade of ‘Pusat Islam’ (Islamic Centre); he ordered the newsreaders for RTM, the national television broadcast to 
begin the News with the Islamic greeting ‘assalamualaikum’; and the declaration that UMNO is the biggest Islamic 
party in Malaysia. The establishment of the Islamic bank in 1984 was perhaps one of the most important milestones 
during the Islamisation process, owing to the devout Malaysian Muslims who were eagerly expressing their wish for 
an Islamic economy system to replace the conventional banking (Mutalib: 1993: 29-30). 
While the global Islamic da’wah resurgence was taking place elsewhere, it was also affecting Malaysia too. 
Coincidently with the coming of a new power into the Malay leadership and a new type of UMNO. This happened 
when Mahathir as a non-aristocratic, locally educated and somewhat anti-West become the Prime Minister of the 
country in mid 1981. Hence, UMNO has started to counter-attack Islamic resurgence with its own Islamisation 
programme, particularly in respond to the challenge of its rival, PAS. In order to ‘out-Islam’ PAS, Mahathir went for 
a more promising step by co-opting Anwar Ibrahim, the charismatic leader of ABIM, the Muslim Youth Movement 
of Malaysia in 1982. That year he introduce a policy called “Inculcation of Islamic Values”. Although the policy is 
no longer applied it has change fundamental landscape of Malaysia economically, politically, educationally and 
bureaucratically. Since, the process of Islamisation was proven by establishment of major federal bureaucratic 
infrastructures and increase of the power of the National Council for Islamic affair. The position of the kadis or 
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Islamic Judges was upgraded and the Shariah Court was put at the same level with the civil and magistrates courts. 
Islamic bank (Bank Islam) was introduced providing Islamic insurance and mortgage. The International Islamic 
University and Islamic Teacher Training College were found. The Halal Food Certificate was launched on food 
productions, et cetera. 
In the same year of his cooptation of Anwar, Mahathir declared to ‘Islamise government machinery’ and claimed 
that Malaysia was already and ‘Islamic State’ (Mauzy: 1997: p277). Every Malay states as well as the federal 
government threat Islam as a special interest where official bodies for promoting Islam exist in all of them. Under 
Mahathir government the Malaysian government could be said to be more supportive towards the development of 
Islam. However, it was obvious that Mahathir’s supportive policies in favour of Islam can be majorly explained as 
an attempt to outmanoeuvre the main rival Islamic Party or PAS in their legitimacy quest for Malay-Muslim votes.  
To stay in power, UMNO has to create more Islamic programmes or what Ibrahim Ahmad (1989: 69) calls it as ‘to 
challenge Islam with more Islam’. 
Mahathir’s view on Islam is quite clearly liberal. Undoubtedly, he did not aspire to be an Islamic theologian, nor he 
was admiring the ulamak (Islamic scholars). He did not aspire to a comprehensive view of the relationship between 
religion and government and he believed that the decline of Islam was due largely to the ulamak’s rejection of 
secular knowledge. When PAS in Kelantan proposed to establish the Islamic hudud law, he rejected the proposal 
completely (Milne and Mauzy: 1999: 84).  
Mahathir in particular and UMNO in general had no choice to discredit PAS other than to play the game of ‘Islamic 
State’. While Mahathir was promoting his version of Islamic State, he rhetorically spoke against PAS for wanting to 
introduce an Islamic State. So here, during the 10th General Election campaign he raised the issue of religious 
freedom, as Bridget Welsh observes (2005: 134), against PAS who was clearly the strongest party within the BA 
coalition. The BN then labelled PAS supporters as ‘fundamentalists’ and even worst ‘deviationists’. The BN kept 
talking to non-Muslims about PAS trail to establish Islamic hudud law which was portrayed as an endeavour to 
eradicate the consuming alcohol, socialising with the opposite gender and other matters that relates to freedom. 
Since 90s there is a large number of Malay Muslims turn to mosques and suraus (prayer houses) for prayers and 
religious talks and lessons. The Government of Malaysia and the ruling elites are also greatly turning and 
participating in the growth of Islamic awareness. This situation was depicted quite clearly by Mutalib (1993: 33) in 
his writing: “Upon analysis, this increasing emphasis on Islam by the Malaysia ruling elites is the more 
understandable because in recent years, other than pressures exerted by the Islamic Party (PAS), there are 
indications of a closer identification with Islam taking root amongst the general Muslim population”. 
Anwar was like Mahathir towards Islamic policy. For instance, they were both promoting Islamisation and critical 
on the traditional form of Islamic education system. Milne and Mauzy (1999: 144) believe that if Anwar was a 
Prime Minister he would also move towards Islamisation and he does not have any hidden Islamic Agenda. He has 
been an idealist who shows interest not only in Islam but also other Asian religions and civilisations, as well as 
Western civilisations and cultures. While was in the government, Anwar was promoting the idea of ‘Islam Madani’ 
which was humanist and individual-centred interpretation of Islam.  
PAS in many ways plays a great part in pressuring the country into Islamisation process. Integral to its electoral 
manifestos is the clear aim that they want to see the eventual emergence of the ‘Islamic State’. During its bond with 
the government coalition between 1974 and 1977 it gained not only experience of administrating the bureaucracy 
but also influenced to stress for more Islamic orientation within the government. It existence in the coalition had 
quickened the Islamisation trend within the government. Albeit its union with the government did not last long, it 
did wipe out UMNO’s accusation that the party carries fanatical and extremist ideology and it does not have 
experience in running the country (Hussein: 1991: 14). 
Party Islam se-Malaysia had been through some major change since its inception. Nevertheless, it greatest change 
could be said following one of its General Assemblies  (Muktamar Agung) which are held as an annual basis. 
Following it General Assembly of 1982 the party since transformed and has a new look which clearly ‘out-Islam’ 
UMNO in all its aspects. The party image has since heightened to become one which is keener than ever before to 
‘Islamise’ the country when it received a new leadership under the ulamak (Islamic scholar). 
Another step of party’s transform into ulamak oriented was it Muktamar Agung of 1989. Hence, PAS nationalist 
leadership was completely toppled by ulamak, old and young. The four new leaders or ulamak that transformed the 
party are; Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat; Abdul Hadi Awang; Fadhil Noor and finally Nakhaei Ahmad. All the four are 
graduates from Al-Azhar University in Cairo.  
In addition to the ‘tarbiyah’ conducted on its members, the party also runs traditional Islamic education institutions 
366   Abu Dardaa Mohamad et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  140 ( 2014 )  361 – 366 
(pondok), Islamic schools (primary and secondary) and PASTI (Islamic kindergartens), as well as Islamic courses 
and lectures in mosques and prayer houses, camps and seminars. In the writer’s opinion, these public Islamic 
educations are just strength of PAS as they would give the party more support in the future. Perhaps, Islamic 
education is one of PAS strategies towards Malays acceptance of its idea of Islamic state.  
Roald (1994: 254) observes that PAS ambition to turn Kelantan into an ‘Islamic State’ has scared the federal 
government, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Matters that are considered as ‘offensive’ to Islamic belief, such as 
gambling and drinking alcohol for Muslims, are prohibited. An Islamic code of dress was also introduced in 1992 
where Muslims and non-Muslims are requested to dress appropriately. By state legislatures, PAS of Kelantan and 
Terengganu have actually passed Hudud Bills but their implementation has been blocked as the matter of penal code 
must first entail constitutional amendment.  
 
Conclusion 
Subsequent to presenting the transformation of PAS from a da’wah organisation into a political movement, it is 
showed by the study that the movement had played a vital role in shaping Muslims politics in Malaysia which 
means the politics of Malaysia itself as they are the majority. It is believe that when an Islamic movement is capable 
to integrate between da’wah and politics besides other social requirements, it would make a major transformation 
within the society or country. 
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